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I. INTRODUCTION
Jesse installs the free one-month Internet trial on his computer in about ten
minutes. When he signs on, he goes to one of the dozens of free e-mail ser-
vices and gets a new e-mail address. This process, which takes another five
minutes, involves filling out a number of forms asking for such information as
Jesse's age. Jesse puts down fictional data for all the questions. The last page
of the application is a huge block of fine print, which he scrolls past-without
reading-to click on the "Accept" button. He does not bother to write down his
password; he does not intend to ever check the new account. Then he heads
over to a free homepage provider.' It takes him fifteen minutes to sign up for a
free homepage. It only takes that long because everybody has already taken
the names he wants.2 He finally settles on "QUAKE," drawing inspiration
from one of his favorite computer games, 3 and enters a fake name and address
to obtain his fifty megabytes of free web space. Jesse gives his new e-mail
address as his contact information. Again, the last page of the application is a
massive block of text. He scrolls past it, again without reading, and hits the "I
agree" button. Next, Jesse spends a half-hour designing a front page for his
website. He uses a shareware program he downloaded from the Net to convert
a song from a popular movie soundtrack into an MP3 file he can load to his
website. As he closes the MP3 converter, a window comes up telling him the
program's shareware license expired a month ago and he must purchase the
program. As he has regularly done for the last month, he clicks the "OK" but-
ton and the window goes away. Jesse goes to his friend's website. The friend,
Kevin, has a variety of screen shots from a recent, popular movie on his
homepage. Kevin obtained the pictures from his computer's DVD player,
which allows him take screen shots at any point in the movie. Jesse saves a
couple of Kevin's pictures to his website. Just to make Kevin mad, he puts
Kevin's shot of the Miss July Playmate on his own front page. While doing so,
he notices the white lettering "Copyright Playboy Entertainment" written on
1. E.g., http://www.tripod.com. Tripod.com is a registered name belonging to Lycos Networks. Lycos
is a registered trademark of Carnegie Mellon University.
2. Tripod.com, one of several free homepage providers on the Intemet, has over one million
subscribers. See About Tripod, at http://www.tripod.lycos.comabout/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2001).
3. Quake is a popular computer game copyrighted and trademarked by id Software. id Software, at
http://www.idsoftware.com (last visited Apr. 8,2001).
one side of the picture. Jesse opens the picture using a common program that
comes packaged with most computer operating systems and clips the lettering
off the picture. As he uploads his new website to the Internet, he realizes how
long it is taking. He swings over to an auction site and checks on a bid he
made yesterday on a DSL modem. He is on his fifth month of free Internet
offers, and it is about time to move up in the world.
The Internet is a vastly different place than it was even five years ago.
Bandwidth-the speed at which one can access the Internet-is higher, due to
new uses of technology like cable modems, satellite Internet service providers,
and school networks; MP3, DVD, and other new digital data formats allow
huge amounts of music, movies, pictures, or other information to be com-
pressed and downloaded in minutes.4 Web pages are available to the masses
through free services that offer everything from e-mail to drag-and-drop code
editors.5
But the biggest difference of all may be the people on the Net. The In-
temet is populated by a generation introduced to the Net as already being one
of the most popular past times, shopping tools, and communication methods in
history.6 The generation moving onto the Net now is not used to being told
what it is not permissible to do because, as recent history has shown, one will
likely soon have the technology, awareness, and even legal permission to do
the supposedly offensive act after all.7
Try explaining to Jesse that he just "infringed" on a copyrighted game ti-
tle, an MP3 of a copyrighted song, an editing program, movie screen shots, and
magazine pictures. When one has explained infringement to him, then one can
move on to contract-violating e-mail addresses. While on the topic of personal
ethics, one might as well raise the issue of abusing limited-license trials for
Internet access. Unfortunately, Jesse probably would not know or care about
what he was hearing.8 In fact, as this Comment will argue, most of the people
he infringed on will most likely never take action against him, either.
This Comment examines the relationship between the most prominent en-
tertainment industries on the Internet-traditional (movies, music, television)
and interactive (software and console video games)-and their Web-based fans.
4. See S. E. Oross, Fighting the Phantom Menace: The Motion Picture Industry's Struggle to
Protect Itself Against Digital Privacy, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 149, 150-152; see also Charles R.
McManis, Taking Trips on the Information Superhighway: International Intelluctual Property Protection
and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 ViLL. L. REV. 207, 207 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Welcome to Tripod!, at http://www.tripod.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2001) (offering fifty
megabytes of free web space).
6. See Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Should
be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 36-37 (1977).
7. See id. at 36.
8. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS&ENT.L.J. 29,50-51(1994)
("The current copyright statute has proved to be remarkably education-resistant .... [O]ur current
copyright statute could not be taught in elementary school, because elementary school students couldn't
understand it. Indeed, their teachers couldn't understand it. Copyright lawyers don't understand it.").
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The conclusion is simple: current intellectual property law cannot adequately
protect the entertainment industries' intellectual property from casual "fan"
infringers on the Internet.
Part II of this Comment is a survey of issues in copyright and other intel-
lectual property ("IP") law, particularly in light of new technology. 9 Part III is
a detailed look at issues and cases that define current Internet law.'0 Part IV is
a summary of the entertainment industries and the status of their copyrights on
the Internet." Part V is an analysis of the obstacles that prevent the entertain-
ment industries from rescuing their intellectual property from their fans. 2 Part
VI is a brief look at some alternative ways to protect entertainment intellectual
property on the Internet. 3 Finally, Part VII concludes that the entertainment
industries are more likely to benefit from the changes than to lose. 14
II. COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright protection in the United States derives from the first article of
the Constitution, which authorizes laws "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'" Congress en-
acted the first Copyright Act in 1790.16 In the intervening two hundred years,
Congress has amended the Copyright Act several times, largely due to devel-
opments in technology.' 7
9. See infra notes 20-105 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 106-175 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 176-222 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 223-238 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 239-246 and accompanying text.
87. Litmansupra note 8, at 68.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See Act ofMay 31, 1790,ch. 15, §, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). Thisfirst Copyright Act
protected only "any map, chart, book or books already printed." Id.
17. Congress gave copyright protection to designs, prints, etchings, and engravings in 1802, musical
compositions in 1831, dramatic compositions in 1856, photographs and the "negatives thereof' in 1865,
and statuary and "models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts" in 1870. See Act
of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171, repealed by Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 14, 4 Stat.
436,436,439, amended by Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139, amended by Act of Mar. 3,
1865, ch. 126, §§ 1,2, 13 Stat. 540,540, repealed by Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198,212
(repealed 1909). In 1909, Congress tried to give more extensive protection, stating that "all the writings
of an author" were now protected. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 4, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 4 (West Supp. 1990); recodified 1947; repealed
1976). However, Congress was again forced to amend the Copyright Act as a result of technological
developments. In 1912, motion pictures were protected (Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5(1)-(m), 37 Stat.
488,488 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(l)-(m), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(l)-(m), recodified
1947, repealed 1976)), and sound recordings in 1972 (Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § I(b),
85 Stat. 391,391 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(n), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(n), (repealed
In 1976, Congress culminated decades of study and stopgap measures with
the Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"). "8 The 1976 Act attempted to compen-
sate for the massive surge in technological advances with intense study and
careful language.' 9 For example, the 1976 Act extended copyright protection
to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or de-
vice."20 This broad definition allows protection for a remarkable variety of
data, including pseudo-tangible materials such as electronic information on
computers." However, this broad definition has also been at the heart of
heated litigation as the courts struggle to draw the lines between the rights of
the creator and the needs of the user.22 The task of trying to protect elec-
tronic-based works, particularly computer software, has deeply challenged ex-
perts.2' "Defining the scope of software copyright has become one of the most
intractable problems in the emerging field of computer law." 24
Today, a prima facie case for copyright infringement of computer software
involves establishing ownership of a work and that the work was copied.
Ownership is most easily demonstrated by a Certificate of Registration.26
Copying is often the most difficult prong to prove, because direct copying is so
easy to disguise.27
1976)).
18. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§§ 9-10,94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
19. For example, in 1974, Congress created the National Commission for New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") to study ways to apply the copyright laws to "automatic systems capable
of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information." Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201 (b)-(c), 88 Stat.
1873, 1873-74(1974). For a thorough discussion of CONTU, see generally Arthur R. Miller, Copyright
Protectionfor ComputerPrograms, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: IsAnything New Since
CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1993).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
21. See generally Miller, supra note 19, at 982-85.
22. See generally id.
23. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19, at 980; John W. L. Ogilvie, Defining Computer Program Parts
Under Learned Hand's Abstractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91 MICH. L. REv.'
526, 526-27 (1992); Mary L. Mills, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An
Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change,
65 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 307, 309 (1989).
24. Richard A. Beutel, Sofiware Engineering Practices and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Can
Structured Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 1
(1991).
25. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher
v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1996).
27. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1231; see also Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d
1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). Copying may be "proved inferentially by showing that the defendant had
access to the allegedly infringed copyrighted work, and that the allegedly infringing work is substantially
similar to the copyrighted work." Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1231-32.
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Computer programs28 have tested the limits of traditional copyright lan-
guage at every stage. Before 1980, the 1976 Act did not specifically mention
computer programs.29 Despite this fact, Congress did intend that software be
protected. 30 The 1976 Act and its later amendments seek to establish this fact
beyond doubt." One example of 1976 Act language used to cover software is
the phrase "literary works," defined in section 101 as including "numbers, or
other ... numerical symbols or indicia. 3 2 Courts such as that in Apple Com-
puter v. Franklin Computer have taken this to mean that a computer program is
a "literary work" and is protected from infringement of its object or source
code.33
Early software copyright cases such as Apple Computer struggled primarily
with exactly what types of software should be protected.' Often, the question
was whether the programs were subject to any copyright protection at all.35
Today, no one disputes the copyrightability of literal manifestations of com-
puter programs (i.e., the actual language or code used to make the program
work).36 A more pressing issue has been what degree of protection to afford
non-literal manifestations of computer programs (i.e., the display or output of
the computer program).
Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory37 dealt with this specific
issue. Whelan developed a laboratory management program for Jaslow. s
28. Computer programs and software are synonymous. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
982 F.2d. 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992). The Copyright Act defines a computer program as "a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
29. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 49 (D. Mass. 1990).
30. id. at 48. See also Robert D. Sprague, Multimedia: The Convergence of New Technologies and
Traditional Copyright Issues, 71 DENY. U. L. REV. 635,645 (1994) (discussing the evolution of copyright
law in the face of new technologies).
31. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 49.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
33. 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983).
34. See generally id.; see also Sprague, supra note 30, at 646. Computer programs consist of source
code-a human-readable programming language-that is implemented by a computer in the form of object
code, a machine language. Ogilvie, supra note 23, at 531; Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 44.
Computer programs have also been categorized as either application programs or operating systems. See
Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249-52; see also Sprague, supra note 30, at 646 n.76 (summarizing the
holding in Apple Computer that operating systems should not be given less copyright protection than
applications).
35. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253; see also Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 52 1,
524-25 (9th Cir. 1984).
36. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 45 (listing citations for the modem trend in copyright
protection for software).
37. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 1225.
Whelan retained ownership of the computer program. 9 Jaslow later created its
own version.' However, Jaslow used a different computer language, resulting
in the two programs not being literally similar.4' Nonetheless, the Whelan
court found that the two programs were substantially similar in overall struc-
ture and organization. 2
Literal similarities have never been an absolute requirement for infringe-
ment in any copyright action. "An infringement is not confined to literal and
exact repetition or reproduction; it includes also the various modes in which the
matter of any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with
more or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy."43 Copyright protec-
tion "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations."'
Life has proven to be more complicated. Instead, an infringement analysis
must ask whether similarities between two works constitute impermissible
copying, or "unlawful appropriation."4 The critical issue is often whether the
defendant copied too much.' "[N]o one infringes, unless he descends so far
into what is concrete [in a work] as to invade ... [its] expression. ' 41
Judge Learned Hand developed a test for this type of analysis in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., now infamous as the "abstractions test":
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could pre-
vent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his
property is never extended.4 s
To establish infringement, plaintiffs must show two things: that two works
are substantially similar; and that the similarities involve protected expres-
sion.49 There "must be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. "Each programming language has a unique grammar and set of meanings. Two programs may
perform the same functions despite differences in their source code. Conversely, two programs with nearly
identical source code can perform very differently." Ogilvie, supra note 23, at 531.
42. Whelan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1248.
43. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947).
44. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
45. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir.
1977).
46. Id. at 1163; see also Sprague, supra note 30, at 647.
47. Nat'l Comics Publ'ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ'ns, 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951).
48. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2dCir. 1930).
49. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164.
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the expressions of those ideas as well."'  In the past, courts have applied an
"extrinsic/intrinsic" analysis to determine substantial similarity.5
The "extrinsic" test determines whether there is substantial similarity of
ideas.52 The "intrinsic" test determines whether there is substantial similarity
in expressions.53 This second test has also been referred to as the "ordinary ob-
server" test and has caused considerable headache for courts.' As Judge Hand
noted: "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must
therefore inevitably be ad hoc."55
It is also difficult to apply the extrinsic/intrinsic test to determine whether
the non-literal elements of computer programs are substantially similar. How
does the average, ordinary observer know what a computer program looks
like?56 Instead, courts have begun to rely on experts to determine whether the
dissected elements are substantially similar.57
Another significant issue, and one of the biggest obstacles to the substan-
tial similarity analysis, is how does one distinguish protectable expression from
its underlying ideas? s Courts must distinguish abstract ideas from protectable
expression.59 The Whelan court's attempt to resolve this resulted in the holding
that "the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea,
and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of
50. Id.at 1164.
51. Id. at 1164-66; see also Sprague, supra note 30, at 648.
52. Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164. The court explained that the test is
extrinsic because it depends on specific, definable criteria, as opposed to a basic determination by the trier
of fact. Id. The court noted that unlike the intrinsic prong of the test, technical analysis and expert
testimony are permitted, and the court usually decides the issue as a matter of law. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986) (criticizing
the ordinary observer test).
55. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
56. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1232-33. Note that the "ordinary observer" of the second step is
usually the finder of fact and has just finished observing expert testimony about the first step. In an ideal
world, the ordinary observer/fact-finder then forgets everything he or she saw to draw a conclusion for the
second step. We do not live in a perfect world. This transition has often proven to be difficult for juries.
See id.
57. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co., Inc. v. Bando Am., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1513-1514 (D. Colo. 1992),
afTd in part, vacated in part, 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
58. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1163.
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1995) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that a copyrighted book on a bookkeeping
system was not infringed by a similar book when the alleged infringer used a different arrangement of the
system elements).
the expression of the idea."' Later courts criticized this holding as too simplis-
tic in the context of complex computer programming.6 Unfortunately, it seems
practically impossible to come up with a bright-line test to differentiate ideas
underlying a computer program and the protectable expression.62
Another abstractions test issue is the "merger doctrine." Basically, if there
is only a single way to express an idea, the idea and its expression will be
judged to have merged, and no protection will be granted to the expression;
doing so would, in effect, grant copyright protection to-and a monopoly in-the
underlying idea.63
Hard on the heels of the merger doctrine in any abstractions analysis are
concerns about efficiency.' It may be possible that there is only one "right"
way, ultimately, to create a computer program for a specific purpose:
[W]hen one considers the fact that programmers generally strive to
create programs "that meet the user's needs in the most efficient man-
ner," the applicability of the merger doctrine to computer programs
becomes compelling. In the context of computer program design, the
concept of efficiency is akin to deriving the most concise logical proof
or formulating the most succinct mathematical computation. Thus,
the more efficient a set of modules are, the more closely they approxi-
mate the idea or process embodied in that particular aspect of the pro-
gram's structure.65
Courts have constructed further restrictions on copyrightability based on
originality concerns. One restriction on protection comes in the form of the
scenes a faire doctrine. This principle allows courts to refuse to protect expres-
sion that is "standard, stock, or common" to a specific topic, or that logically
follows in a particular setting (e.g., hardware specifications).' 6 Where an ex-
pression is automatic in the treatment of a certain idea, the expression falls
short of the requisite level of originality.67 Additionally, facts are not afforded
60. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1236. Because the idea of dental laboratory management could be
accomplished in a variety of ways, the Dentalab program was part of the program's expression, not its idea.
Id. at 1236 n.28.
61. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,705-06 (2d Cir. 1992).
62. Sprague, supra note 30, at 650. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 834-35 ("Application of
the abstractions test will necessarily vary from case-to-case and program-to-program. Given the complexity
and ever-changing nature of computer technology, we decline to set forth any strict methodology for the
abstraction of computer programs."); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp.
37,60 (D. Mass. 1990) (noting that in determining "copyrightability," one is forced to choose from options
along a continuum of specificity for a standard distinguishing an idea from its expression).
63. Sprague, supra note 30, at 651. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 838; see also Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
64. Computer Assoc. Int'l, 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992)
65. Id. (citation omitted).
66. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 838.
67. Id.
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copyright protection. Facts exist independently of the discoverer; he cannot be
their author." Another restriction concerns expressions that are in the public
domain, perhaps due to time, careless error, or deliberate abandonment, and are
therefore not protected.69
Other tests have attempted to improve on the Whelan Associates court's
approach for determining infringement for non-literal elements. In Lotus De-
velopment Corp. v. Paperback Software International, Judge Keeton discussed
a three-part test. 70  First, he suggested, identify the underlying idea of the
work.7 Second, evaluate the individual elements of expression that comprise
the work to determine whether each expression is within the functional require-
ments of the work or whether it is in the public domain, as opposed to being an
original expression. 72 Third, to determine the work's copyrightability, the trier
of fact must determine whether any of the elements deemed to be original ex-
pression constitute a substantial part of the work.73
Currently, the trend is toward the use of the "abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison" test.74 In step one of this test, the court applies a
traditional abstractions test. 75 In step two, expressive elements that do not qual-
ify for protection are filtered out in order to separate protectable expression
from non-protectable material. 76 In the third step, the court's "substantial simi-
larity inquiry focuses on whether the defendant copied any aspect of this pro-
tected expression, as well as an assessment of the copied portion's relative im-
portance with respect to the plaintiff's overall program.
77
The Tenth Circuit adopted this test in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemi-
cal Industries, Ltd..7 In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,
Inc., Judge Keeton ruled that his three-part test was fundamentally compatible
with the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.79 The Ninth Circuit and the
District Court for the Northern District of California have also adopted the
68. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,348 (1991); see also Gates Rubber
Co., 9 F.3d at 837.
69. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 837-38; see also Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992).
70. 740 F. Supp 37, 60-61 (D. Mass. 1990).
71. Id. at 60.
72. Id. at 61.
73. Id.
74. This test first appeared in Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir.
1992).
75. Id. at 706-07.
76. Id. at 707.
77. id. at 710.
78. 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that the difficult task of determining what parts of a
program are protectable can be accomplished by the use of the "Abstraction -Filtration-Comparison" test).
79. 799 F. Supp. 203, 211-12 (D. Mass. 1992).
test." This trend suggests that courts may be moving toward a consensus on
software copyright analysis.
This consensus could be jeopardized if some courts choose to take the test
to its logical extreme by finding that if there are no protectable elements of ex-
pression, then there is nothing to protect in the software as a whole. In other
words, how can the sum of nothings be something? The Whelan Associates
court considered this issue and resorted to simply looking to the Copyright Act
and a few earlier decisions to support its holding that the structure and organi-
zation of a computer program can be protected. 8' Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has expressly stated that a work containing no individual protectable ex-
pressions can still be copyrightable. For example, in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., the Supreme Court's conclusion was that
even merely choosing how to arrange facts, if adequately creative, could consti-
tute enough originality to be protected.82
A plaintiff in a software copyright infringement must show that the defen-
dant "copied protectable elements of the plaintiffs program and that those
protectable elements comprise a substantial part of the plaintiff's program when
it is considered as a whole." 3 However, what non-literal elements of an alleg-
edly infringed computer program can be protected, and do those elements com-
prise a substantial part of the program? Judge Keeton, for example, gave little
80. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Atari Games
v. Nintendo of Am., No. C 88-4805 FMS, C 89-0027 FMS, 1993 WL 207548, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. May
18, 1993); Apple Computer v. Microsoft, 821 F. Supp. 616, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
81. See Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222,1239 (3d Cir. 1986). The court stated:
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides ... support.. . that Congress intended that the structure
and organization of a literary work could be part of its expression protectable by copyright.
Title 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) specifically extends copyright protection to compilations and
derivative works. Title 17 U.S.C. § 101, defines "compilation" as "a work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship," and it defines "derivative work," as one "based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as... abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted." Although the Code does not use the terms "sequence," "order" or
"structure," it is clear from the definition of compilations and derivative works, and the
protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact that the sequencing and ordering
of materials could be copyrighted, i.e., that the sequence and order could be parts of the
expression, not the idea, of a work.
Id.
The Whelan court also based its decision on early cases which held that a copyright infringement can
exist in the absence of literal similarities. Id. at 1234; see also Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA,
Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that thirteen plot similarities between Battlestar
Galactica and Star Wars could be basis for a holding of copyright violation); Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (similarities between
McDonaldland characters and H.R. Pufnstuf characters could be shown by "total concept and feel" of the
two works).
82. 499 U.S. 340,344, 348-49 (1991).
83. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 833 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Autoskill
v. National Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1476, 1496-98 (10th Cir. 1993)).
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guidance for these questions in Lotus Development Corp.' Judge Keeton exam-
ined the non-literal elements of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program.85 He did
find that the structure, sequence, and organization of the program's menu com-
mand system constituted a substantial part of the-alleged copyrighted work.86
But then Judge Keeton merely concluded that "copyrightability of the user in-
terface of Lotus 1-2-3 is established.
s87
In Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American, Inc., the plaintiff had presented
evidence to the district court below that the defendants had copied the plain-
tiff's copyrighted computer program." The Tenth Circuit, however, returned
the case to the district court on the issue of copyright infringement.89 The cir-
cuit court instructed the lower court to use the abstraction-filtration-comparison
test to determine whether the defendants' copying was actionable infringe-
ment.'
It must be emphasized that the balance between protection of original work
and "dissemination of information has ... tilted toward dissemination." 91 For
example, one common judicial theme has been that producing work does not
mean a person should be rewarded with copyright protection simply because of
his or her effort.92
Computer programmers are therefore free to use the ideas contained in
other programs as long as they do not copy protected expression, a process
called "reverse engineering." 93 Reverse engineering has been considered by a
number of courts.' The legal controversy surrounding this practice stems from
the fact that this reverse engineering process requires the making of intermedi-
ate, direct copies of the other work. Both the Federal and Ninth Circuits have
84. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
85. See id. at 51-52.
86. Id. at 42.
87. Litmansupra note 8, at 68.
88. 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1515, 1519-20 (D. Colo. 1992).
89. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd, 9 F.3d 823, 849 (10th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 834, 849.
91. Robert D. Sprague, Multimedia: The Convergence of New Technologies and Traditional
Copyright Issues, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 635, 657 (1994).
92. Courts developed a theory known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine with "the underlying notion
... that copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into compiling facts." Feist Publ'ns v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991). In Feist, the Supreme Court rejected the "sweat of the
brow" doctrine: "The 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that originality, not 'sweat of the
brow,' is the touchstone of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works." Id. at 359-60.
93. See Karen E. Georgenson, Reverse Engineering ofCopyrighted Software: Fair Use or Misuse?,
5 ALB. L.J. Scd. & TECH. 291,292 (1996).
94. See, e.g., NEC v. Intel, 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc.,
775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
95. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
held that making such intermediate copies is "fair use."96 Noting that the legis-
lative history of the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act "suggests that
courts should adapt the fair use exception to accommodate new technological
innovations,"97 the Federal Circuit in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Amer-
ica, Inc. held that "when the nature of a work requires intermediate copying to
understand the ideas and processes in a copyrighted work, that nature supports
a fair use for intermediate copying."98 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held in Sega
Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade that "where disassembly is the only way to gain
access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted com-
puter program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access,
disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law."" The
Sega court further stated:
Disassembly of object code necessarily entails copying. . . . If disas-
sembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the owner of
the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of
his work-aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by
Congress. . . . In order to enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea or
functional principle underlying a work, the creator of the work must
satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the patent laws."°
To conclude this legal overview and put this discussion in context, one
should note that these are some of the more significant copyright issues related
to software and data, and the controversies caused in those areas by new tech-
nology and uses are similar struggles faced by intellectual property owners
present on the Internet. However, as will be noted below, the difficulties faced
by courts in intellectual property cases are magnified exponentially when deal-
ing with the entertainment industries. °1' These industries are dependent on
media expressing imagination and ideas, and that media is inevitably discussed
constantly on the Internet, where infringement can occur instantly, cheaply,
and repeatedly thousands of times a day. The plodding "case-by-case" analysis
strategies of the courts, as well as the absence of bright-line standards for pro-
tecting data, do little to discourage casual and routine infringement by millions
of fans. As the first case law on these issues makes its way into the books, the
entertainment companies seem on a crash-course with their own fans.
96. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842-43 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The
Atari court stated: "Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that 'fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies.., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
... scholarship or research' is not an infringement."' Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
97. Id. at 842-43 (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679-80).
98. Id. at 843.
99. 977 F.2d at 1527-28.
100. Id. at 1526 (citation omitted).
101. See infra Parts Illff.
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III. INTERNET LAW: ISSUES AND CASES
The Internet is the Pandora's Box of copyright infringement. Once copy-
righted material is uploaded, not only does the Internet allow free, fast, perfect
copying and unlimited distribution, but the copying can be virtually anony-
mous: anyone, anywhere in the world could be responsible for the appearance
of infringing material on the Internet." 2 The cases below reflect the judicial
system's ultimate purpose: to adapt copyright law to new media in a way that
protects authors without unduly restricting people's enjoyment of the In-
ternet. 103
A. Liability
One significant issue, typically the first one to be considered, is who
should be held liable? Internet service providers ("ISPs"), who furnish the con-
nections users dial into to get to the Internet, are often the operators of the
user's homepages, chat rooms, bulletin boards,' °4 and other areas where copy-
right infringement may take place. °5 Copyright holders such often argue that
web site operators and access providers should be held liable for their users'
actions (particularly when-as is usually the case-the users are difficult to lo-
cate or "judgment-proof").'°6 But web site operators and access providers ar-
gue that the measures needed to regulate their users would significantly dam-
age the Internet. Courts, as well as Congress with the passing of The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, have tried to balance the opposing interests. 107
1. Cases
In Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA,05 the court made a finding of fact
that the defendant was likely infringing when the defendant was aware its elec-
tronic bulletin board was being used for distribution of unlawful copies of the
102. See Schlachter, supra note 6, at 20.
103. See John F. Delaney et al., The Law of the Internet: A Summary of U.S. Internet Caselaw and
Legal Developments, 545 PLI/PAT 61,76 (Jan. 1991).
104. As used by this author, the term bulletin board refers to a computer service similar to the Internet
in that users remotely access a unique server to leave messages and files for others to view and use. See,




108. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
plaintiffs video games.' °9 The court also held that specific knowledge of inci-
dents of infringement were not necessary to show contributory infringement if,
as was the case, the defendant actively facilitated and encouraged the copying
(here, by designing the machine that did the copying). "l Finally, the court re-
jected the defendant's fair use defense, finding that the four fair use fac-
tors-purpose and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the
amount and substantiality of the portion used; and the effect of the use upon
the market for the copyrighted work-all weighed against MAPHIA."' The
court was particularly persuaded by the fourth factor, noting there could be a
significant adverse effect on the market for Sega's copyrighted video games. 1'
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,"3 the court held that the defendant,
Frena, directly infringed the plaintiffs works when the customers of the bulle-
tin board uploaded and downloaded the materials, even though Frena's only
involvement with the copyrighted material was that he allowed the photo-
graphs to be stored on his bulletin board." 4 The court found that Frena's dis-
play of Playboy's photographs violated the exclusive right of a copyright
owner to publicly display the owner's work.' The court rejected Frena's fair
use argument, saying, "There is irrefutable evidence of direct copyright in-
fringement in this case." ' 16 The court held that even if Frena had no intent to
infringe Playboy's copyrights, "[i]ntent or knowledge is not an element of in-
fringement."'
2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA" or "Act") describes the
liability of Internet service providers (ISPs") for infringement by users of their
services." 8 The new Act protects ISPs that unknowingly transmit or store
copyrighted material, but also requires ISPs to perform certain prerequisites in
order to qualify for that protection.' 19 According to the DMCA, ISPs do not
commit copyright infringement when they "transmit, route or provide 'interme-
109. Id. at 687.
110. Id. at686-87.
111. Id. at 687.
112. Id.
113. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
114. Id. at 1557.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1559.
117. See also Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Assn. of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (finding a host server was not liable for direct infringement when it only provided the means for the
other party to transmit the infringing work, but may still be liable for contributory infringement); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that a pay-service for
showing images was not protected as merely being funnel to Internet because the purpose of the business
was to show images, not provide Internet access).
118. See Delaney, supra note 103, at 94.
119. Id.
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diate and transient storage' for information provided by their customers or
other persons."'20 For example, an ISP might "transmit, route or provide ...
storage" by caching infringing materials on their servers, hyperlinking to in-
fringing materials on other servers, or storing users' infringing materials at us-
ers request by hosting a website. 121
When an ISP receives proper notice from an copyright owner that a work
is being infringed on the ISPs service, the ISP must remove or block access to
the material. 122 The Act exempts the ISP from liability for taking down or
blocking access to such material in response to the required notice and pro-
vides that failure to take down or block access pursuant to notice will result in
loss of the ISP's statutory exemptions from liability. 123
In practice, targeting ISPs has been a major tactic of IP owners,' 24 particu-
larly the traditional entertainment companies, which have been more aggres-
sive in their enforcement efforts. However, the sheer practical logistics of this
tactic cast its actual effectiveness into doubt. An IP owner must identify possi-
ble infringement and notify the ISP in each case and yet, it seems, has no as-
surance that the infringing fan will not simply move to a new ISP.
B. Criminal Prosecution
In United States v. LaMacchia, the court held that the defendant, a bulletin
board operator who distributed illegally copied, popular software for free, was
not punishable under current law because his actions were not for profit, and
ruling otherwise would criminalize even the creation of a single copy of a
computer program by a home computer user. 125 However, Congress recently
enacted the No Electronic Theft Act, a law that criminalizes a variety of will-
fully infringing acts without requiring proof of financial gain, thus overruling
the LaMacchia decision. 2 6 The new law applies to "individuals who reproduce
or distribute, by electronic or other means, 10 or more copies of a copyrighted
work during any 180 day period."2 7 The act requires that the retail value of
the infringing copies be at least five thousand dollars. 128
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 97.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
125. 871 F. Supp. 535, 544 (D. Mass. 1994).
126. Delaney, supra note 103, at 106.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 106-07.
C. Jurisdiction
In a traditional jurisdictional analysis, the first question is whether the de-
fendant's contacts with the forum state satisfy the requirements of that state's
"long-arm statute.' 29 The next question is whether the statute's exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant satisfies traditional notions of "fair play and
substantial justice.' 30 In answering this question, a court must ask whether the
defendant has contacts with the state such that the defendant could reasonably
anticipate being haled into a court in that state. 131
Unfortunately, the Internet has wreaked some havoc with traditional juris-
diction. Courts have had to consider the extent to which Internet-only contacts
should count in establishing jurisdiction over a defendant in a particular fo-
rum. 32 The Internet effortlessly spans state and even national boundaries; the
operation of a web site could arguably subject that web site operator to limit-
less jurisdiction, according to a traditional analysis. 133
Courts have generally followed three categories of electronic minimum
contacts. 34 The first type is "clear, regular business over the Internet with the
forum state"; courts have generally found proper exercise of jurisdiction in
these situations. 35 The second type of contact is when "a user in the forum
state exchanges information with the defendant through the defendant's
website."136 In those cases, courts assess the level and commercial nature of
the contacts in order to find jurisdiction. 137 The third type of contact concerns
"the posting of information or advertisements on a universally accessible web
site," and courts have generally declined to find personal jurisdiction in these
cases.
38
1. Cases establishing jurisdiction
In CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, the appellate court found a defendant
had sufficient contacts with the forum state when a CompuServe subscriber
had consented to the basic CompuServe service agreement, which states that
129. Long-arm statutes are enacted by each of the states to give guidelines for the exercise of personal




132. See, e.g., John A. Lowther IV, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet Quagmire: Amputating
Judicially Created Long-Arms, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 619, 619 (1998).
133. Id.
134. Delaney, supra note 103, at 184.
135. See, e.g., Part III.C. I infra.
136. Delaney, supra note 103, at 184.
137. Id.
138. Id. Finding otherwise would mean that there very well could be worldwide personal jurisdiction
over anyone with a web site, a rather jarring concept. See Lowther, supra note 132, at 619.
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the agreement would be governed and construed in accordance with Ohio
law.' 39 In addition, Patterson had entered into a shareware registration agree-
ment with CompuServe that was, by its terms, entered into in Columbus,
Ohio. 40 Finally, Patterson sold copies of his software to Ohio residents.' 4' The
court concluded that Patterson knowingly tried "and, in fact, purposefully con-
tracted-to market a product in other states," with Ohio-based CompuServe op-
erating as his distribution center. 42 The court made clear that, because of his
marketing and sale of software, Patterson was "far more" than a purchaser of
on-line services. 43 The court also found that Patterson originated and main-
tained contacts with Ohio when, believing that CompuServe was the company
infringing his software, he sent electronic and regular mail to CompuServe in
Ohio, and posted messages to one of its electronic forums.' 44 However, recog-
nizing the potential implications of its decision, the Sixth Circuit specifically
did not hold that Patterson would be subject to jurisdiction in every state in
which his software was purchased. 4 Nor did it hold that a third party could
sue Patterson in Ohio for claims solely arising out of the software's use.'
46
Lastly, the court did not address whether any regular subscriber could be sued
for nonpayment in Ohio, as had been suggested by the district court. 141
In Inset Systems v. Instruction Set Inc., the court found that advertising on
the Internet was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. 48 In support of its finding, the court noted that, at the time, there
were at least ten thousand Internet users in the state of Connecticut toward
whom the defendant directed its advertising activities on a regular basis. 49 In
addition, the court noted that Connecticut had an interest in adjudicating the
dispute, which concerned issues of state statutory and common law. '50
Similarly, in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., the court
concluded that by knowingly conducting two-way electronic commerce with at
least 3,000 Pennsylvania residents, Dot Com had "purposefull1y] avail[ed it-
self] of doing business in Pennsylvania.'' Accordingly, the court could exer-
139. See 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 (6th Cir. 1996).
140. Id. at 1260-61.
141. Id. at 1265.
142. Id. at 1263.
143. Id. at 1264.
144. Id. at 1266.
145. Id. at 1268.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 937 F. Supp. 161, 165-66 (D. Conn. 1996).
149. Id. at 165.
150. Id.
151. 952F. Supp. 1119, 1126(W.D. Pa. 1997).
cise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.'52 The court was careful to note
that Dot Com "repeatedly and consciously" accepted Pennsylvania residents'
applications, knowing that these contracts would result in the transmission of
electronic messages into Pennsylvania. '
In Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista Technology, Inc., personal juris-
diction was established when a defendant did business in Massachusetts via its
web site and committed a tort that it knew would be felt Massachusetts, even
though the defendant had attempted to avoid contact with the forum state.
5 4
The court noted that companies that choose to do business on the Internet be-
cause of the relatively low start-up costs may have to factor in the costs of be-
ing sued in many different jurisdictions. '55
2. Cases not finding jurisdiction
In Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., a Kansas defendant provided
its dealer and sales information, including phone numbers, addresses, and elec-
tronic mail addresses, but it did not specifically invite Illinois residents to
transact business with the defendant.' The court found the information to be
similar to a national advertisement, which generally would not subject a defen-
dant to jurisdiction in Illinois.'5 7 The court reasoned that advertisements on the
Internet could subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction only if there was
evidence that the defendant intended its advertisement reach the forum state. t5'
In Expert Pages v. Buckalew, the court found that the defendant had di-
rected his activities toward the forum state, but finding personal jurisdiction
would be constitutionally unreasonable because of the difficulty of the forum
for the defendant.'59 The court noted that the plaintiff had much greater re-
sources at his disposal and could much more easily go to the defendant. 160
152. Id. at 1127.
153. Id. at 1126.
154. 960 F. Supp. 456, 472 (D. Mass. 1997).
155. Id. at 471.
156. No. 97 C. 4943, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18687, at *26 (N.D. Il. Nov. 12, 1997).
157. Id.
158. Id. See also Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25
(2d Cir. 1997) (holding that without specific evidence that the defendant conducted or directed activities
with or toward the forum state, no personal jurisdiction exists).
159. No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12205, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997).
160. Id.
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D. Other Issues in Internet Law
1. Shareware 6'
In Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club,162 the defendant dis-
tributed shareware already freely available on the Internet to its customers for
a membership fee. 163 The court held that the distribution was copyright in-
fringement because the distribution violated the authors' written restrictions
accompanying the shareware, and the potential market for the product was hurt
because fees were charged and improper technical support was provided by the
defendant.64 The court found that the plaintiffs' free distribution of the soft-
ware on the Internet was not consent for continued distribution because of the
restrictions accompanying the product. 165
2. "Framing" and "linking"
A major feature of the Internet is the ability to follow links from site to
site. 66 However, parties are beginning to attack unauthorized links to their
sites. 16 "Framing" technology goes a little further into the realm of question-
able tactics. 16' Framing occurs when a webpage allows visitors to view content
from another website without actually leaving the original webpage; in effect,
the "framed" website appears-whether obviously or subtly-to be part of the
original webpage.' 69
In Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction re-
straining Applied Anagramics' use of a framed link to Futuredontics's Internet
161. As used in this Comment, the term "shareware" indicates software offered for little or no cost to
users as incentive for the users to purchase the developer's software. Sharon Williamson, Recent
Developments in Copyright Law, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 199,209-10 (1998). Shareware software is
usually limited in some way, such as by a time limit on use or by missing features that can only be found
in the full version of the software program. Id.
162. 95 C 2154, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11789 (N.D.I1. E. Div., July 29, 1998).
163. Id.
164. See generally 95 C 2154, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11789 (N.D.Ill. E. Div., July 29, 1998).
165. Id.
166. See Nicos L. Tsilas, Minimizing Potential Liability Associated with Linking and Framing on the
World Wide Web, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECrus 85, 85 (2000).
167. See id. at 85-86.
168. Id.
169. Id.
web site. 7° The Ninth Circuit held that Futuredontics had failed to demon-
strate either the possibility of irreparable injury or that the balance of hardships
tipped sharply in its favor.17' Specifically, the court noted that even if the
framed link did imply that Anagramics-rather than Futuredontics-was respon-
sible for the success of Futuredontics dental referral service, it was not tied to
any tangible loss of business or customer goodwill. 72
3. Metatags and similar trademark infringement
Trademarks sometimes arise as an issue in Internet infringement cases
when, without permission, someone places another company's trade name or
trademark in the underlying source code of its web site.7 3 Although the infor-
mation is not visible to the Internet user, such information is read by search
engines that then direct Internet searchers to that site. '74
In one dispute,' a law firm, Oppedahl & Larson, sued parties who had
placed references to "Oppedahl" and "Larson" in the underlying source docu-
ments of their respective web sites.'76 In its complaint, the law firm alleged
that the defendants used the terms "Oppedahl" and "Larson" in their respective
underlying source documents to deceive the public into believing there is a
connection between the plaintiff and the defendants. "'
Similarly, in another action, a federal judge ordered a web site operator to
remove encoded phrases about Playboy magazine from the operator's source
documents on two adult-oriented web pages that had not been authorized to
use the Playboy name.'78 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. initiated the action after
discovering that these two unauthorized sites appeared when a user ran a
search using the terms "Playboy" and "Playmate." 179
4. Electronic contracts: "click-wraps"
More and more, website visitors are being confronted with "click-wrap"
agreements: non-negotiable, electronic agreements that are accepted by click-
ing-appropriately enough-an "I ACCEPT" button. 80 The enforceability of
these agreements is unclear, but commentators have analogized them to cases
170. No. 97-56711, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 17012, at *3 (9th Cir. July 23, 1998).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Delaney, supra note 103, at 121.
174. Id.




178. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1218, 1218 (order granting
preliminary injunction).
179. Id.
180. Delaney, supra note 103, at 199.
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involving "shrink-wrapping." 181
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the court found "shrink-wrap" licensing en-
forceable, if otherwise contractually valid. 182 The court found that the software
industry has a common practice of bundling license agreements with the plas-
tic wrapping of a software box. 8 3 The licenses are effective as soon as the cus-
tomer tears the wrapping from the box.'8' Similarly, in Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., the computer manufacturer defendant bundled the terms of sale-including
an arbitration clause -with a computer purchased by the plaintiffs, with the stip-
ulation that if the buyer did not return the computer within a month, the buy
had accepted the terms. 185 The appellate court found this gave sufficient notice
to the plaintiffs and enforced the terms of sale. '86
One click-wrap case that is available is Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie,
Inc.187 Several subscribers to Hotmail's e-mail account service failed to con-
form to Hotmail's "Terms of Service" click-wrap agreement, part of which
prohibited use of the address for "spamming.'188 The court granted Hotmail's
motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that Hotmail had demonstrated a
likelihood of succeeding on all of its claims based on the defendants' breach-
ing of the Terms of Service click-wrap agreement. 189
In surveying the current law, it is important to note that current law
changes on a monthly basis as courts consider dozens of issues for first time. 19°
The fact that courts or Congress could grant or deny protections at any moment
makes protecting intellectual property on the Internet extremely difficult.' 9' As
can be seen in Part IV infra, the entertainment industries have been dropped
squarely into the thick of the morass.
181. See, e.g., id.
182. 86 F.3d 1447, 1448 (7th Cir. 1996). Shrink-wrap licensing derives its name from the fact that
software is often sold wrapped in clear plastic, and the license agreement becomes active upon the tearing
of that plastic wrapping. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
186. Id. at 1148, 1150.
187. No. C98-20064, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. April 16, 1998) (order granting
preliminary injunction).
188. Id. at 4-5. "'Spam' is unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail akin to 'junk mail' sent through the
postal mail." Id. at 3.
189. id. at 21-22.
190. See Delaney, supra note 103, at 76.
191. See id.
IV. THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES AND THE INTERNET
A. Traditional entertainment
1. Generally
In 1896, Thomas Edison, inventor of the kinetograph and phonograph,
showed the first movie to an audience in New York.19 2 By 1920, "talkies" had
had a huge impact on the viewing public, and in the 1940s, the Hollywood stu-
dios were the ruling force in the movie industry.' 93 There were five large stu-
dios-Warner Brothers (now part of Time Warner); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer;
Paramount (now owned by Viacom); Twentieth Century Fox; and RKO (which
no longer makes movies).' 94 Three smaller studios were Universal Studios
(now part of Seagram); Columbia pictures (now owned by Sony); and United
Artist Pictures (now a component of MGM). 195
In 1946, movie ticket purchases peaked at 4.7 billion, then decreased be-
cause of television. 9 6 Only in the 1970s would the rise of special effects
blockbusters like Star Wars bring the movies back. 97 Perhaps enlightened by
their lean years, the traditional entertainment companies have branched out in
the years since and now control cable networks, record companies, film com-
panies, and publishing businesses.'"9
Despite their wariness, the movie businesses is far from suffering a return
to those bleak years. The market has expanded to the point that traditional
movie powerhouse like Walt Disney, Paramount, Warner Brothers, 20th Cen-
tury Fox, and Sony have been joined by such newcomers as DreamWorks and
Pixar, whose computer-animated movies (such as Toy Story, the highest-gross-
ing movie of 1995) have revolutionized the industry. '99
The average cost of creating a movie in the United States is 50 million
dollars.2° ° Some of the more special-effects-prone movies cruise well past the
100 million dollars mark.2' That money is remade in a number of ways. First,
about 7 billion dollars comes from movie theater tickets, and this number does
192. Jason Cother, Movies & Music Industry, at
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not show any sign of shrinking: admissions increased seven percent in 1998.202
However, this is not where the real money is.203 The distribution of movies to
cable and satellite brings in about 32 billion dollars, while home videos add
another 18 billion dollars.2 o4
Music is also a traditional entertainment force significantly impacted by
the Internet, perhaps even more so than movies, at least today.2 °5  Recorded
music brought in 12 billion dollars in 1998, and that number is expected to
continue to increase. For example, rap and soundtrack albums both increased
in sales more than 30 percent between 1997 and 1998. 206
The international market is also a large moneymaker for the traditional
entertainment industry. Movie companies made almost 7 billion dollars over-
seas in 1998.207 American music also dominates the world market. 205
2. Protecting intellectual property on the Internet
Virtually all of the major studios have web sites, and copyrighted material
can inevitably be found there.20 9 Music companies have web sites as well; in
addition, because of the direct retail nature of their product, many Internet re-
tailers advertise and distribute music IP. 210
The traditional entertainment companies tend to be extremely restrictive in
their attitude toward unauthorized use of their copyrighted material and trade-





205. Note the recent Napster crisis, as many commentators have. See, e.g., Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA
v. Napster: A Window onto the Future of Copyright Law in the Internet Age, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPurER& INFO. L. 755,758-59 (2000). Music has the disadvantage of being easily transportable even
in its final form due to its small size, and pirated music is virtually as good as anything that someone could
purchase from a retailer. Id. The movie industry has a limited advantage in the fact that piracy of movies
in their final form is still a technologically significant challenge, and even a fully pirated copy of a movie
still lacks the draw of a full movie theater. Valenti Warns the Dangers of Internet Piracy Before
Congressional Subcommittee, athttp://www.mpaa.org/jack/99/99 10_28a.htm (Oct. 28,1999) ("Currently
our films are protected by two factors-the amount of time needed to download a full-length motion picture
and the lack of unprotected digital copies of our works.").
206. Cother, supra note 192.
207. Id.
208. For example, Australia's top 10 best-selling albums of 1998 included country superstar Shania
Twain, the Titanic soundtrack, and Madonna. Id.
209. See, e.g., http://www.disney.com (containing pictures of Mickey Mouse and other copyrighted
characters).
210. See, e.g., http://www.cdnow.com (selling music by online orders; customers can preview music
by listening to clips run from the web site).
a. Non-litigation tactics
The three most common non-litigation tactics are cease-and-desist letters,
limited licenses with built-in repercussions for infringement, and the targeting
of ISPs.211 Cease-and-desist letters-legal communications giving notice of the
allegedly infringing behavior and making demands that the behavior stop-are
the most common and, in some ways, the most risky tactic for the entertain-
212ment company. Fans tend to react rather strongly to perceived ingratitude
from the objects of their affection.213 A Wired News article quotes one fan-site
creator about a threatened boycott after a Viacom copyright-enforcement cam-
paign: "If they're not going to back down, and we have to make the ratings
fall, we will."
214
Giving fans limited licenses to show material-accompanied with promi-
nent disclaimers that the site is not affiliated with the entertainment com-
pany-has been suggested by some commentators and implemented by a few
studios. 2 5 However, the effectiveness has yet to be shown. The only practical
effect of this tactic might be to remove the entertainment company's right to
legal recourse against casual infringers in exchange for a pat on the head by
fans: "Yeah, I took it, but okay, it's still yours." 216
Finally, attacking ISPs that host fan sites is rapidly becoming a successful
way to combat troublesome fans. This tactic has been discussed in more detail
supra in Part III.A.217 However, as discussed previously, the sheer impractical-
ity of having to monitor and give notice to each ISP for each infringing fan site
is staggering, particularly in light of the fact that each fan may promptly turn
around and repost his material on a different ISP within hours.
b. Cases against non- or "semi-" profit infringers
Two important cases in which companies-entertainment and other-
wise-acted to protect their intellectual property on the Internet are Playboy
211. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (interpreting the 1996 Communications Decency Act to bar
action against ISP for negligent dissemination of defamatory messages when the ISP was unaware of the
dissemination).
212. See Erika S. Koster & Jim Shatz-Akin, Set Phasers on Stun: Handling Internet Fan Sites, 15 NO.
1 COMPUrER LAW: 18, 21 (1998).
213. Id.
214. Steve Silberman, The War Against Fandom, WIRED MAGAZINE (visited Nov. 7, 1999), at
http://www.hotwired.compackettsilberman/97I22/ndex3a.html ("Silberman, Fandom").
215. See, e.g., Koster & Shatz-Akin, supra note 212, at 22.
216. See id. at 19 (observing that many fans even openly admit on their websites that the site contains
copyrighted material).
217. See notes 121-27 supra and accompanying text.
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Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena218 and Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Iron Eagle of
Central Florida, Inc. 219 In both cases, the companies acted to stop casual in-
fringement of their intellectual property by fans. These cases are classic exam-
ples of the response and tactics of the traditional entertainment companies and
are used regularly in legal action between fans and copyright holders. 20 An-
other three recent examples of traditional entertainment's strategy for fan-con-
trol are Viacom's campaign against Star Trek fan sites; 22 ' Fox's campaign
against Millenium fan sites; 222 and Sony's campaign against Oasis band fan
sites.
221
These campaigns are markedly different from the strategy used by the in-
teractive entertainment industry.224 These two very different schools of




Interactive entertainment has become a major industry only in the last de-
cade.226 However, the industry exploded in the 1990s. Today, according to a
recent survey, the number of people favoring computer and video games over
television was double that of the television fans, and even more individuals
think the games more entertaining than going out to the movies. 227 Half of fre-
quent video and PC game players say interactive entertainment offers the best
entertainment value, far outstripping the next most common selection: reading
218. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). The importance of Playboy v. Frena is explained in Part
III.A. 1. supra.
219. 973 F. Supp. 1421 (M.D. Fla. 1997). The significance of Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Iron
Eagle of Central Fla., Inc. is explained in detail in Part III.A. 1. supra.
220. For discussion of these and similar actions, see Part III.A. 1  supra.
221. See Silberman, Fandom, supra note 214.
222. Steve Silberman, Fox Slams Bootleg Millenium Sites (Nov. 7, 1999), at
http://www.hotwired.comspecial/millennium/ ("Silberman, Fox Campaign").
223. Oasis 'Netaction-report 113/5/97, (May13, 1997), athttp://www.thei.aust.comisite/asp2.html.
224. See infra Part IV.B.
225. As used in this Comment, "interactive entertainment" means video and computer game developers
and manufacturers.
226. Americans Overwhelmingly Rate Video/PC Games as Most Fun Entertainment Activity for
Second Straight Year, BUSINESS WIRE, at
http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw.051399/191330282.htm (May 13, 1999).
227. Id.
books.22 There were almost two interactive games sold for every household in
America in 1998, or about 200 million units.22 9 The majority of video and
computer game players are adults.230 Over half of the most frequent console
game players and almost three-quarters of frequent computer garners are age
18 or older.23' Studies show that virtually all computer games and nine out of
ten video games are purchased by adults.232 Studies also show that one-third of
all console gainers and half of all computer gainers are women, numbers that
are increasing.233 The most popular types of computer and console games
Americans buy are: 1) puzzle/board/card and learning games; 2) action games;
3) strategy, driving/racing, and adventure/roleplaying games; 4) sports; 5) sim-
ulation games and children's stories; and 6) creativity games. 2
The last few years have seen consistent double-digit growth for the indus-
try, generating 5.5 billion dollars of business.23 The video game industry
grossed 20 percent more profit in 1999 than 1998.236 Eventual gross profit for
1999 exceeds 7.4 billion.237 Including computer games and "edutainment soft-
ware," valued at 2 billion and 700 million, respectively, the interactive enter-
tainment industry will gross over 10 billion dollars in 1999.238 Sales of
console-style video games exceeded gross movie receipts for the first time ever
in 1999.239
2. Protecting intellectual property on the Internet
The interactive entertainment industry's attitude toward fans and protec-
tion of their intellectual property gives new meaning to the term laissez-fair.
For example, a fundamental marketing tool in the industry is the distribution of
map editors and game "hacks" (programs to create "mods," or alternative ver-
sions of the games).240 The computer software developers also regularly re-
lease the programming source codes for adaptation and distribution by the pub-
lic; for example, id Software has posted source codes and editors for several of









236. Mike Snider, Industry pockets sales as garners choose Pikachu. USA TODAY at I (Nov. 3, 1999),




240. See, e.g., Archives-Source (last modified Dec. 21, 1999), at
http://www.idsoftware.com/archivessourcearc.html.
[Vol. 28: 879, 2001] Internet-Based Fans
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
mods and levels. 24 John Carmack, a lead programmer at id Software, is cred-
ited with beginning the tradition of leaving computer games open for mods.2 42
Finally, the game developers routinely release screen shots and game trailers to
fan sites with only unofficial restrictions -if any-on use.243
There have been virtually no suits or other actions by interactive entertain-
ment companies against fans,24 except when the "fan" was clearly operating
for primarily commercial purposes. 
245
V. THE PROBLEMS FACING THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES
As Internet piracy-much of it by well-meaning fans-reaches truly epi-
demic proportions, the time has come to decide: what must be done to salvage
intellectual property on the Internet? Faced by conflicting strategies and a bil-
lion fans with their own minds made up, the courts may decide, "Nothing."
With the problems facing traditional enforcement, and the success of the
laissez-faire interactive entertainment model, courts may drop copyright and
trademark law and look for something else.
A. Practical problems
First of all, there are a number of practical problems that pose serious
challenges for entertainment companies on the Internet today and tomorrow.
Four of these are: ease of piracy, jurisdiction, difficulty locating defendants,
and the high cost of enforcement.
The ease-of-piracy problem represents a truly fearsome threat to intellec-
tual property on the Internet. While the 1976 Copyright Act is a testament to
Congress's ability to respond-sometimes at their own pace-to new technolo-
gies, the Internet may pose problems that outstrip the long arm of the legisla-
tive branch. At the turn of the century, the average speed at which a user con-
nects to the Internet-and is thus capable of downloading or uploading infring-
ing material-is less than 56 kilobytes a second.246 Three years ago, it was a
241. Id.
242. See Tom Chick, It's a Mod, Mod, Mod World (Nov. 7, 1999), at
http://www.gamecenter.com/Features/Exclusives/Mod/ss0 I.html.
243. See, e.g., Blues News, at http://www.bluesnews.com.
244. As John Carmack ofid Software has noted, without fan development ofthe game, Doom would not
have gone on to be the entertainment-record-setting product that it was. However, in a legal sense, this tactic
has the practical effect of a virtual surrender of fundamental intellectual property rights. See generally
Chick, supra note 242.
245. See, e.g., Sega Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679,687 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
246. Computer Partners, High Speed Connections, at
http://www.compar.com/infopool/articles/newslvsl4.html (April 2000).
fraction that fast. Three years from now, with the advent of ADSL, cable mo-
dems, satellite Internet access, network-level access through Ti or T3 lines to
schools, etc., the average connection speed may have multiplied ten times.247
Considering the fact that even today, a relatively knowledgeable college stu-
dent can download a full, digitized copy of a popular movie (sometimes days
before its release in theaters) in a matter of hours in his dorm, the physical im-
,pediments to piracy are almost completely insignificant.248 In addition, im-
provements in such technologies as DVD, CD-recording drives, and MP3
encoders means that even a casual technology user can generate, store, and
distribute massive amounts of directly infringing material in almost no time.24 9
These copies are usually perfectly similar to the originals. 230
247. Id.
248. S.E. Ross, Fighting the Phantom Menace: The Motion Picture Industry's Struggle to Protect
Itself Against Digital Piracy, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 149, 150-52.
249. Id. at 152.
250. Id. Fan copies of intellectual property may even be better than the original. For example, see
reproduced infra the "read-me" attached to a fan re-digitized trailer of the Warner Brother's 1999 film The
Matrix (actual document on file with author):




Video Size 480 x 320
Video Bit Rate 2400000 bits/sec
Audio Bit Rate 384 bits/sec
Audio Information 44.1 KHz 16-bit Stereo
Frame Rate 24 frames/sec
Media Length 02:25
Created April 25, 1999
This trailer is a high resolution MPEG- I that we decided to make because the only other quality
trailer is the one found on www.whatisthematrix.com. However, that Quicktime trailer lacks
audio mixing (the voices are in the left channel, the music in the right) and the video requires
a Pentium II just to run the full frames.
Our version is re-encoded from the offical Quicktime version into a high resolution MPEG-I
video format. We took the voices and music and mixed it together while adding some stereo
effects and enhancing many portions of the trailer including the musical section featuring "The
Eyes of Truth" by Enigma.
So you are asking, why did we do this? The reason is simple. The Matrix is an incredible
movie that we both really enjoyed and we thought it would be cool if people had this high
quality trailer that they could watch. If you haven't seen the movie yet, GO SEE IT!
If you are going to distribute this, please include this info file because it gives an explanation
and we also don't want it to be mistaken as an "Offical Release." (Although it could be heheh)
Dracore & rZanatosl from EFnet
Special thanks to Nocturnal Fury, Dan-O, Syndicate and Emerald Phoenix for offering
suggestions.
[Vol. 28: 879, 2001] Internet-Based Fans
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
As discussed in Parts II and III, supra, jurisdiction is a huge obstacle to an
entertainment company seeking to protect its copyrighted works. Under the
analyses articulated by courts, the vast majority of Internet fans would not
have minimum contacts with any state other than their own. Courts would al-
most certainly force the entertainment company to go to the defendant. In
cases where the defendant may be international, the problem gets even thorn-
ier.
Even before jurisdiction can be established, an entertainment company
may be faced by a much more fundamental problem: determining whom the
infringer is. Internet culture thrives on its anonymity, and the incentives to
avoid using one's true identity are significant: dodge junk mail, create a "new,
improved" persona to interact with others, obtain more free e-mail addresses
and free homepages for each fake identity, et cetera. Even with the help of a
compliant ISP, a copyright holder may get no closer to the infringer than a
misnomer and a fake address.
Assuming that an infringer can be identified, located, and served, the en-
tertainment company must ask itself what the benefits are. The cost of going
after an Internet fan are high, in terms of the effort to adjudicate a case based
on the uneasy, gray law of copyright, the reputation damage with the fans who
support the industry, and the lack of deep pockets at the end of the rainbow.
B. Psychology
Another practical concern of significant impact is, quite simply, the In-
ternet culture itself. The Internet is regarded by many of its participants as a
"borderless, self-policing domain where traditional laws do not and should not
apply., 251' Regardless of how solid a copyright infringement action is, Internet
citizens will most likely regard it extremely negatively.,52 Even Web authors
who understand they are infringing copyrights view their web sites as benefi-
cial to the copyright owners, and they regard efforts to enforce copyrights
against them as unfair and ridiculous. 3 Coupled with the speed of communi-
cation and close communities that characterize the Internet, an entire fan base
will likely rise up in arms as an attack on one of its members.M The amazing
251. Koster & Shatz-Akin, supra note 212, at 21.
252. Id.
253. Boba Fett,athttp://www.frii.com/joe/bf..home2.html (last modified Dec. 15, 1997). This fan page,
devoted to Boba Fett, a character from the Star Wars films, included the following "disclaimer": "Boba Fett,
Star Wars, and all characters, events, etc. relating thereto are registered trademarks of LucasFilm and all
rights for such are reserved. It [sic] is used here without permission in the hopes that they will be cool and
not sue me over what is actually free advertising for them."
254. See Koster & Shatz-Akin, supra note 212, at 21.
speed at which information travels across the Internet, the close-knit nature of
the virtual fan communities that form around fan sites, and the influence
wielded by many fan-Web masters all amplify the potential downside to using
traditional methods to police Web-based copyright infringers.255 In many cases
where violators received standard cease-and-desist letters, fan web masters
immediately posted the letters and complained to visitors that they were under
attack by greedy corporate types. 
25 6
Repairing the damage done by angering a Web-based fan is difficult, con-
sidering the popularity of chatrooms and newsgroups. In addition, there is al-
ways the risk that another media outlet will catch wind of the story and turn it
into a "David vs. Goliath" story. 
257
The entertainment industries have taken completely different paths into
this mess. Interactive entertainment has generally embraced the Internet com-
munity. 28 For example, the game companies regularly feed news to the myri-
ads of fan news sites on the web, and game designers routinely give updates on
their latest projects available to their fans; the updates are referred to as
".plans" and consist of personal notes by the designer. 259 Faced by fan sites and
web-based discussion forums that attract visitors by using game companies'
intellectual property, some developers have even thrown up their hands and
joined in. For example, at a fan site for the turn-based strategy game Jagged
Alliance, the lead developer for the game series made thirty-one posts on the
discussion board, none on which commented on the fact that the site-which
sells advertising space-was decorated with his intellectual property and trade-
marks.2' 6 On the other hand, traditional, entertainment companies have some
notoriety for picking fights with the fans.261 Movie studios in particularly have
periodically carried out campaigns against fans, even those with a few small
icons of copyrighted characters.262 These campaigns have been fought by fans
who see the legal action as the ultimate in betrayal.
The effect of this clash will likely be that the fans are left choosing for
themselves what to believe. Their actual legal obligations are almost incom-
prehensible to them.263 A few pictures on their web sites do not seem harmful
255. See id.
256. See, e.g., Silberman, Fandom, supra note 214.
257. Id.
258. See supra Part IV.B.2.
259. See, e.g., Blues News, http://www.bluesnews.com.
260. Jagged Alliance Galaxy, at http://www.ja-galaxy-forum.com/cgi-
bin/ubb/search.cgi?action=simplesearch&ForumChoice=ALL&ExactName=yes&SearchUser=Ian+Cunie
(February 13, 2000) (listing fan discussion group contributions by lead developer of Jagged Alliance).
261. See supra Part IV.A.2.
262. See Schlachter, supra note 6, at 23 nn.50-51; see also Michael T. Helfand, Note, When Mickey
Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional
Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992) (explaining how the unauthorized use
of fictional characters can result in a judgement of infringement).
263. See Litman, supra note 8, at 50-51.
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to anyone. 264 Legally, with one industry telling them that screenshots are great,
and another industry threatening them with an injunction, courts may soon balk
at telling the typical fan he or she is wrong.
C. Fair use
The fair use doctrine has always been a significant issue in software law.
Courts have allowed copying as part of reverse engineering, for example.265
Game companies have generally not countered fans who create new games out
of the old; in fact, the game companies have often directly encouraged the fan
creativity by making available game editors, source code, graphics engine
specifications, and so on.2 66 Today, the biggest action and strategy computer
games routinely ship with editors bundled in the box. 267
Some protection for fans may even be afforded by such holdings as that in
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 268 The defendants had
created a device that significantly altered the plaintiffs games, and the plain-
tiff alleged the defendant had created an illegal derivative work.269 However,
the court held that because every derivative work was based on a legally pur-
chased copy of the Nintendo game, there was no infringement.27 ° Nintendo is
generally understood as saying that the way a game is viewed may be changed
without constituting infringement. 271
While the campaigns against infringing fan sites may help to preserve the
studios' rights in their works, there is the new risk that the courts may set an
unfavorable precedent by ruling the efforts are fruitless against the millions of
Intemet-borne fans, and it would be arbitrary and capricious to continue them
against fans. For example, in Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Iron Eagle of
264. Id.
265. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
266. In fact, one common route into the gaming industry is to create mods for existing games. If your
mod is liked by the game company, they may even purchase the distributing rights for your mod from you!
One recent example at the time of this article would be Gunman Chronicles, published by Sierra Studios
in 2000. Gunman Chronicles began life as an intricate derivative work of Half-Life, a game created by
Valve in 1997. See Brian Rubin, Game Reviews-Gunman, at
http://www.ga-source.com/reviews/gunman.shtml (Jan. 29, 2001).
267. See Marc Salzman, 3D Level Design: Expert Advice, at
http://www.gamespot.com/features/3d design/conclusion.html (last visited April 17,200 1) (noting the trend
for all major computer game developers to include game editors to extend the longevity and popularity of
their products).
268. 964 F.2d 965 (9th. Cir. 1995).
269. Id. at 967.
270. Id. at 972.
271. See, e.g., Sprague, supra note 30, at 668 (arguing that Nintendo demonstrates the tenuousness of
traditional copyright law when applied to multimedia intellectual property).
Central Florida, Inc., the court observed that the plaintiffs copyrighted mate-
rial was widely available on the Internet, despite the plaintiff's claims that they
attempted to protect their intellectual property. 272
The effect of this confusion in the fans' eyes is that interactive entertain-
ment is encouraging fans while traditional entertainment is over-aggressively
attacking them. Courts may simply find that, for reasons of efficiency, most
fan use of media that has become widely available on the Internet should be
considered fair use.
D. Ineffective licenses
Commentators have observed that the Internet population is usually not
adequately educated about the technicalities of copyright infringement, exclu-
sive rights to distribute, and licensing.273 Although cases exist that lend sup-
port to the concepts of click-wrap and shrink-wrap licensing, these cases may
not be binding when courts are confronted by a slew of users who could not
have understood the licensing language even if they had read it, and would
react with disbelief if they had. 274
VI. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROTECTION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ON THE INTERNET
A small sampling of promising ideas for alternative protection are de-
scribed below, demonstrating the breadth of possibilities.
A. Limited functionality
This is the shareware approach. Software developers distribute versions of
their software with limited functionality; customers who like the shareware can
purchase the software or data on the seller's terms. 275
B. Copy protection
Some content-producing programs can encode content in a way that dis-
torts copies. While this seems like the obvious solution to everyone's prob-
lems, the reality is more complicated. Not only is copy protection strongly
272. 973 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
273. Schlachter, supra note 6, at 20-21.
274. See id. at 36-37.
275. Id. at 38. See, e.g., Release Software's Embedded SalesAgent Technology Superdistributes
Software Over the Internet, at http://www.rsasecurity.com/news/pr/960729-1 .html (last visited Apr. 8,
2001); see also Lisa Bowman, MS moves to mandatory registration, at
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2435946,00.html (last visited February 10, 1999)
(discussing anti-piracy measure implemented by Microsoft in Office 2000 that causes the product to
malfunction after launching it fifty times without registering).
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resented by customers, but the technology is easily penetrable by hackers.276
However, the technology is still being used in some situations.277 If nothing
else, the technology could inhibit most casual infringement. 271
C. Digital certificates
A certification authority can issue to a user a computer file (a "digital cer-
tificate") that identifies the user and the user rights associated with that person.
In these ways, vendors can use digital certificates to control access to system
resources, including intellectual property files, by making files available to
users who can provide a digital certificate with specified rights. Material ac-
cessed in this way could be custom-marked for each user so that further distri-
bution could be monitored. 279
D. "Pay-per-view"
One commonly discussed solution is to make intellectual property avail-
able over the Internet, either for free-supported by advertising-or through an
access fee.280 Napster and similar services are exploring this as a way to le-
gally distribute intellectual property on the Internet. 281
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the failure of IP law to provide any security to the entertainment
industries from their Internet fans, this is not the death knell of intellectual
property. First of all, IP law does not need to be perfect to work. 282 "Copyright
doesn't work today because people pay 100 percent of the time. It works be-
cause people pay often enough that intellectual property owners make a
profit. 28 3 As history has shown, technologies that seem like terrible threats
276. Philip E. Ross, Cops Versus Robbers in Cyberspace, FORBES, Sept. 9, 1996, at 136, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/090996/5806134a.htm.
277. Cf. id. (describing how Macrovision "spoilers" are inserted into movies; the spoilers confuse VCRs
and produce distorted versions of the movies if copied).
278. Id. at 139 (quoting Kenneth Spreitzer, president of Maximized Software, which produces one form
of the copy protection technology).
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Oross, supra note 4, at 157-58.
281. Dennis Fisher, Napster has serious catching up to do, EWEEK, at
http://www.zdnet.com/eweek/stories/general/0, 11011,2654819,00.html (Nov. 16, 2000).
282. Schlachter, supra note 6, at 51.
283. Id. (quoting Margie Wylie, Can Copyright Survive the Digital Age? Should It?, DIGITALMEDIA:
A SEYBOLo REPORT, July 3, 1995).
today often become key assets to the supposed victims. 2m A good example can
be found in the movie studios' action against video cassette recorder manufac-
turers, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,285 where the studios at-
tempted. to sink a technology that-in the form of video cassette
rental-generated 13 billion in revenues for the studios in 1993,2s6 a figure that
climbed to 18 billion by 1998 and continues to grow. 287
In the future, Jesse may approach the Internet a little differently.
Jesse installs the free Internet trial on his computer in about fifteen min-
utes. When he signs on, he goes to an e-mail service and gets a free e-mail
address, which takes only a minute. The digital certificate accompanying his
parents' multimedia account enters the personal information for him. Then he
heads over to a home page provider. It takes him fifteen minutes to sign up for
a free homepage. He gives the new e-mail address as his contact information.
Jesse then opens the page design tool and spends a half-hour designing a front
page for his website. He runs into a problem when the shareware program he
downloaded from the Net to convert his favorite MP3 will not open: "Your
shareware period has expired." Shaking his head, he pulls out a credit card and
pays the small fee, which has dropped drastically since the new shareware lim-
its forced everybody to pay. One consolation is that he gets all the MP3s for
free through his parents' flat-fee multimedia account. He selects an MP3 and
converts it to a soundtrack for his website. Then he heads to his friend's
website. The friend, Kevin, has a bunch of screen shots from a recent action
blockbuster on display. Kevin got them free from Warner Brothers, some sort
of a limited license in exchange for putting disclaimers on the bottom of his
pages. Jesse tries to save some to his own website, but as usual, the embedded
code distorts his copies.
"I gotta get one of those licenses."
He looks up Warner Brothers' e-mail address and writes a letter. After
Warner Brothers' servers do a quick, automatic check of his digital certificate,
Jesse begins downloading his own pack of screenshots. As the download con-
tinues, he realizes how long it is taking. He swings over to the auction website
284. See Litman, supra note 8, at 46 ("Whenever we have discovered or enacted a copyright exception,
an industry has grown up within its shelter."); see also Oross, supra note 4, at 158 ("Make no mistake:
Hollywood will survive the digital onslaught just as it and its industry compatriots have survived the many
precursors.").
285. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
286. Current Revenue of Target Markets, UPSIDE, Dec. 1994, at 18 (depicting a graph drawn from a
Yankee Group study).
287. Cother, supra note 192. The Napster situation could very well prove to be the next example of
this. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 281 (describing Napster's efforts to become a viable for-profit service).
Napster was created as an Internet tool that allowed users to share music with exceptional ease, bringing
to light the massive scale of online copyright infringement when it was discovered that a significant portion
of the traded music had been pirated from compact discs. Id. After litigation, Napster and similar services
such as MP3.com began licensing the music and distributing it for profit. Id. At the time of this writing,
it remains to be seen whether this will be as successful as the entertainment industries' reluctant but
fortuitous embrace of video cassette recorders.
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and checks on a bid he made yesterday on a new modem. He is on his fifth
month of legal Internet, and it is about time to move up in the world.
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